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WATER LAW -Rights of Importers and Developers of Water. City and
County of Denver v. Fulton Irrigating Ditch Co., 506 P.2d 144 (Colo.
1972).*

About half the water used by the City and County of
Denver is transmountain water. Denver obtains this water
by diversions from the Colorado River Basin, which naturally flows westerly from the west side of the Continental
Divide to the Pacific Ocean. The water is diverted from
three Colorado River tributaries, the Frasier River, the
Williams Fork River, and the Blue River, into the South
Platte Basin on the easterly side of the Continental Divide,
which flows easterly into the Missouri River. The water is
used for domestic and industrial purposes as well as for some
lawn irrigation. Most of the household and industrial water
is collected in sanitary sewage systems, given primary sewage
treatment in Denver's treatment facility and then given further treatment at the Denver Metropolitan Sewer District
plant and returned to the South Platte River above the headgates of the Fulton Irrigating Ditch Company and other defendant ditches.
In 1940, Denver agreed with the defendant ditches that,
because of a cessation of sewage discharge from a Denver
sewer, Denver would not make successive uses (i.e., a subsequent use by Denver for a different purpose than the original use) of the transmountain water which it imports to the
South Platte River Basin.
The immediate cause for the declaratory judgment action
was that Denver entered into a contract with the Adolph
Coors Company which would result in a successive use of the
water diverted from the western slope. The Coors contract
contemplated a sale by Denver of a small amount of its
transmountain effluent into the South Platte for the account
of Coors. Coors could use this water to supply downstream
calls from ditches on the Platte and withhold an equivalent
amount of Clear Creek water for general industrial uses at
its brewery in Golden. Thus Denver sought a declaratory
judgment as to two questions:
Copyright@ 1974 by the University of Wyoming
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(1) Whether Denver may make successive uses of the
diverted transmountain water while its dominion over the
water continues.
(2) Whether Denver may make an exchange of water
under the agreement with Coors.
The Colorado Supreme Court held that, in the absence
of an agreement on its part not to do so, Denver (1) may reuse, (2) may make successive use of, and (3) after use may
make disposition of imported water. But because of the 1940
agreement with the defendant ditches, Denver may not exchange water under the Coors contract.'
The water which Denver diverts from the western slope
into the Platte is clearly foreign water. Foreign waters are
those imported into a basin from another watershed.2 The
rights which inhere in the importer of these waters are different from those relative to waters originating in the basin
in which they are appropriated.' Although junior appropriators have a right to maintenance of stream conditions
while in-basin water is at controversy, Stevens v. Oakdale Irrigation District illustrates that appropriators on a stream
have no vested right to continuance of importation of foreign
waters which another has brought into the watershed.' In
the Stevens case the defendant had constructed storage and
diversion facilities to bring a continuous flow from the Stanislaus River to the Lone Tree Creek watershed. The plaintiffs
had gone to considerable expense for the construction of
diversion works to capture the foreign flow past their property. The court held that the plaintiffs had no vested right
to the continuance of the foreign water flow. In reviewing
the relevant law the court said:
City and County of Denver v. Fulton Irrigating Ditch Co., 506 P.2d 144
(Colo. 1972).
2. F. TRE-,LEASE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON WATER LAw, 100 (1967).
3. See, e.g., Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 272
P.2d 629, 631 (Colo. 1954), holding that junior appropriators have vested
rights in the continuation of stream conditions as they existed at the
time of their appropriation, and subsequent to such appropriation they
may successfully resist all proposed changes in points of diversion and use
of water from that source which in any way materially injures or adversely affects their rights.
4. Stevens v. Oakdale Irr. Dist., 13 Cal.2d 343, 90 P.2d 58 (1939).
1.
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Waters brought in from a different watershed and
reduced to possession are private property during
the period of possession. When possession of the
actual water, or corpus, has been relinquished, or
lost by discharge without intent to recapture, property in it ceases. This is not the abandonment of
a water right but merely an abandonment of specific
portions of water, i.e., the very particles which are
discharged or have escaped from control ... . [P]ast
abandonment by defendant of certain water, as distinguished from a water right, has not conferred
upon plaintiffs any right to compel a like abandonment in the future .... 5
Thus the importer of foreign waters may abandon water
after using it in the second watershed, but no abandonment
of the water right accrues to the benefit of downstream appropriators. In applying this rule to the facts of the Fulton
case it seems clear that, in the absence of an agreement to the
contrary, the downstream ditches have no right to use Denver's imported water except the specific portions which
Denver voluntarily allows to escape and flow down the South
Platte.
A more unique example of this principle, at least from an
engineering point of view, is illustrated in the case of City
of Los Angeles v. City of Glendale,6 where water was imported from distant watersheds by means of an aqueduct.
Once the water was within the second water-shed the plaintiff used two means to join the water with a subsurface
reservoir which eventually rose to a point where the plaintiff
could make a beneficial use of the water. First, it utilized
spreading grounds where the foreign water sank into the
ground and traveled to plaintiff's diversion works. Second,
it sold water to farmers who were so situated within the basin
that 271/2 percent of that water sank into the ground and joined
the underground reservoir. The defendant sought to remove
this water through wells under claim of right. In quieting
title in the City of Los Angeles to these waters, the California
court said that Los Angeles did not abandon its right when it
spread the water for the purpose of economical transporta5. Id. at 61-62.
6. 23 Cal.2d 68, 142 P.2d 289 (1943).
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tion and storage.' Further, the court held that the use by
others of this water as it flowed into the subterranean basin
does not cut off plaintiff's rights.' The court referred to
the Stevens9 case, where it was recognized that one who brings
water into a watershed may retain a prior right to the water
after permitting others to use the water for irrigation."
Thus, since appropriaors have no vested right to a continuance of importation of foreign waters by others, and the importer may make a disposition of that water without reference
to the rights of other appropriators, it follows that downstream users are not entitled to an appropriation of the foreign water. The importer or developer need not have an
existing appropriation in the second watershed for the rights
delineated in Stevens and the principal case to inure to his
benefit. The Colorado court, in Coryell v. Robinson," ruled
that where an appropriator by his efforts lawfully contributes
to a natural stream or stream basin water which otherwise
would not have reached the basin, it is his, independent of
any original adjudication or decree, because by his labor he
has contributed extraneous water to the normal flow.' 2 But
this rule was of no avail to Coryell because the seepage and
percolating waters he sought to appropriate would, if allowed to continue their natural course, have reached the river
draining the watershed in which Coryell sought an appropriation.
The Fulton court, in recognizing the applicability of
these rules in Colorado, undertook to define the terms used
to describe the rights of an importer of foreign water.'"
"Re-use" means a subsequent use of imported water
for the same purpose as the original use ....
"Successive use" means a subsequent use by the
water importer for a different purpose ....
Id. at 294.
Id. at 295.
Supra note 4.
City of Los Angeles v. City of Glendale, 23 Cal.2d 68, 142 P.2d 289, 295
(1943).
11. Coryell v. Robinson, 194 P.2d 342 (Colo. 1948).
12. Id. at 346.
13. Supra note 1, at 146.
7.
8.
9.
10.
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"Right of disposition" means the right to sell,
lease, exchange or otherwise dispose of effluent containing foreign water .... .
Though these rights accrue to an appropriator who introduces foreign water into a stream system by virtue of a recent
Colorado legislative enactment," the Colorado court has long
held this to be the measure of rights at common law.'" The
Fulton court cited these cases as defining "developed water"
as "that water which has been added to the supply of a natural
stream and which never would have come into the stream had
it not been for the efforts of the party producing it."7 Thus
in the Ripley 8 case, the plaintiff was entitled to sell water to
downstream users who were not the holders of senior decrees
because the plaintiff had "developed" the water by draining
water from mines which was trapped between layers of impermeable granite.'
The Fulton court, recognizing no distinction between the rights of the developer and importer of
water, said that both may use, re-use, make successive use of,
and dispose of the water.2"
The main principle evolving from Fulton and its forerunners is that contributions to a natural stream belong to
the one who made them.2 ' It follows that appropriators on
a stream have no vested right to a continuation of importation of foreign waters which another has brought to the
watershed. 2 Moreover, the water right, as distinguished
from right to the possession of a particular corpus of water,
in foreign water cannot be abandoned in favor of downstream
appropriators."
PROBLEM OF IDENTMCATION

Once it is determined that certain water is imported or
developed water and that the water is subject to the plethora
14. Supra note 1, at 146-47.
15. CoLO. Rzv. STAT. § 148-2-6 (Supp. 1969).
16. See Comrie v. Sweet, 225 P. 214 (Colo. 1924) and Ripley v. Park Center
Land & Water Co., 90 P. 75 (Colo. 1907) (hereinafter cited as Ripley).
17. Supra note 1, at 147.
18. Ripley, supra note 16.
19. Ripley, supra note 16, at 76.
20. Supra note 1, at 147.
21. Ripley, supra note 16, at 76.
22. Brighton Ditch Co v. Englewood, 237 P.2d 116, 122 (Colo. 1961).
23. Supra note 4, at 61.
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of rights attendant thereto, the problem arises as to exactly
what water it is to which these rights attach. That is, when the
importer deposits the transmountain water in the basin, and
it becomes commingled with in-basin waters, how does the
importer know he is only taking out the imported water as
opposed to the natural flow? Does the importer lose his rights
once the waters are deposited in the natural stream and he
loses dominion over them? The cases are in some conflict,
but the better view is that to the extent the importer can identify the water he has imported he retains all his rights in it.
One view which might indicate that the importer loses
some rights once the imported waters are deposited in a
natural stream comes from the language in the Stevens" case.
The Stevens court observed that when possession of the actual
water has been relinquished, or lost by discharge without
intent to recapture, property in it ceases." Certainly if the
importer could adequately establish his intent to recapture
and re-use, make successive uses of, and make a disposition
of the water after using it, he would retain all rights to that
water. But the development of an irrigation district must
necessarily be a gradual one and perfection of the system
to the point of fullest beneficial use of all water is not attained
in a day." Thus problems of proof of intent may well arise
given the long periods of time necessary for development of
facilities to clearly manifest the intent to retain rights in the
imported water.
In a case not involving imported water, but artificially
developed water, 7 the New Mexico court said,
[O]nly natural waters flowing in streams and water
courses are subject to appropriation; . .. the creator
of an artificial flow of water is the owner of the
water so long as it is confined to his property, but...
when such artificial waters are deposited in a natural
stream and the creator of the flow has lost his dominion over the same, such waters become part of the
24.
25.
26.
27.

Supra note 4.
Id. at 61-62.
Id. at 63.
Hagerman Irr. Co. v. East Grand Plains Drainage Dist., 187 P. 555 (N.M.
1920).
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waters of the stream, and are subject to appropriation and use ... 2

Certainly the importer could abandon his importation and
diversion works with impunity as was seen in the Stevens
case, but the suggestion is that the rights in the importer are
diminished once the water is deposited in a natural stream.
The same thought was expressed in an early Colorado
case. In Burkart v. Meiberg9 the plaintiff had made use of
surface drainage coming from the defendant's lands. After
some thirteen years of such use, the defendants dug a ditch
on their land and thus intercepted their surface drainage and
transported it for further irrigation. The Colorado court
found that the defendant had the right to so intercept the
water. The court said, "So long as, and while, the water
which is applied by defendants to the irrigation of their lands,
remains upon the same, it is, as against the plaintiff, their
exclusive property .... ,""Certainly this case did not involve
imported or developed water, but the suggestion is clear that
while the water remains on an appropriator's lands, it is his,
but once it escapes to the lands of another the former loses
his rights to that water.
The rule in Wyoming is not entirely clear. One of the
issues in Wyoming Hereford Ranch vi Hammond Packing
Co.8 involved the right to certain water contained in sewage
from the City of Cheyenne. The city had contracted with
Hammond Packing Co. to discharge its sewage on certain
lands owned by Hammond. Because of the value in discharging sewage where it would not become a nuisance, the
court said the city might so discharge the sewage" [W]ithout
any consideration of the demands of water users who might
be benefited by its disposition in some other manner."82 But
the rule was different as regards sewage discharged into a
sewer line which was a channel of the stream. The court held,
"[T]he quantity unconsumed and returned to the stream is
then a part of the water of the state." 88 Thus once these waste
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 558.
86 P. 98 (Colo. 1906).
Id. at 99.
286 P. 764 (Wyo. 1925).
Id. at 772.
Id. at 773.
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waters are mingled with the waters of the stream they become
part of it, with the prior appropriator having the greater
rights. It might be urged, however, that since this case concerned waters already within the watershed, it would
have no application to the waters contributed by an importer
or developer.
Another view is illustrated in United States v. Haga,'
where the court spoke to the problem of identification.
It is not necessary that he confine it upon his own
land or convey it in an artificial conduit. It is requisite, of course, that he be able to identify it; but, subject to that limitation, he may conduct it through
natural channels and may even commingle it or suffer it to commingle with other waters. In short, the
rights of an appropriator in these respects are not
affected by the fact that the water has once been
used.'
This rule seems preferable to one requiring the appropriator
to maintain dominion and control over the water at all times.
Considerations of convenience and economy demand adoption
of the Haga rule, for to hold otherwise would be to say that
an appropriator must construct recapture-facilities in places
where nature has provided a ready means of recapture.
Colorado, in the Fulton case, has adopted the economically sound view that water is fungible or is to be treated the
same as a fungible article.3 6 With reference to the facts of
the particular case the court said, "The particles of water do
not have to be identified as coming from Western Colorado,
but rather water, whether or not contained in effluent, can
be divided volumetrically.' "3 With the advancement of
modern engineering techniques which enable one to measure
and thus identify certain waters, the view adopted by the
Fulton court is imminently preferable to a rule which would
require an importer to keep the foreign water separate from
natural in-basin waters. Any other rule would result in need34.
35.
36.
37.

276 F.
Id. at
Supra
Id. at

41 (D.C.D. Idaho 1921).
43.
note 1, at 150.
150.
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less waste of resources without providing any concomitant
benefit.
"RE-USE, SUCCESSIVE USE, AND RIGHT OF DISPOSITION" IS
ECONOMICALLY AND ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND.

As demands for quality water increase, the law governing
re-uses, successive uses, and rights of disposition becomes
important in dictating the general quality of water, the cost
of the water, and its availability for future uses. If the increased welfare resulting from application of the maximization principle 8 is to be realized, a rule of allowing re-use, successive use, and giving rights of disposition regarding imported and developed water is sound. By allowing an importer or developer to re-use his water, demands on the stream
are decreased. Were Denver able to re-use and make successive uses of westen slope water it would not need as much
South Platte water to satisfy its growing needs, hence, more
water would be available for economic development downstream.
As water quality becomes more important and the costs
of pollution imposed by the pollutor on society increase
(through lost and lessened economic opportunity), water reuse may provide an answer. One idea involves cyclic process
systems."3 The idea is akin to the process used in a car's
cooling system or that of a refrigerator. That is, water is used
to cool a part of the engine, returned to the fan to be cooled
(reprocessed), then sent back through the system to do its
work again. The whole process is enclosed in a system where all
costs are internalized. Industry could, in some cases, adopt
a similar system so that water would flow through the plant
to do a job, then be returned to be processed and thereafter
be sent back to be re-used. Well-designed, complete, and welloperated cyclic process systems are virtually pollutionless
whether in nature or made by man. They involve least depletion of reserves, least discharge, and so least possibility of
38. See F. TRELEASE, A WATER CODE FOR ALASKA: A REPORT To THE STATE
OF ALASKA 14-17 (Paper 1962).
39. Gallop, Pollutioless Cyclic Process Systeins, in COMPLETE WATEREUSE 463
(L. Cecil ed. 1973).
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environmental pollution." This is not to say that every pollutor will, or should, immediatey embark upon a cyclic process
system. Clearly in some cases the benefits to be gained from
quality water as opposed to polluted effluent may not nearly
approach the cost of producing a pollutionless cyclic system.
Economics is the prime motivating force of industry and the
use of reclaimed wastewater is governed by the scope of alternate water supply, procurement, and treatment. In locations
where public water supplies of good quality and quantity are
available at low cost, treatment and re-use of renovated water
by industry has not been economically attractive."' But where
the welfare generated by water re-use is greater than the
cost of obtaining that re-use, a law allowing a water user to
pursue the economically feasible course is to the benefit of
society. Thus in allowing the market to allocate our resources to their maximum use the general rule allowing the
importer or developer of water to allocate that water to reuse, successive uses, and giving him the freedom of disposition regarding that water gives the maximization principle
the breathing room it needs.
DAN RIGGS

40. Id. at 475.
41. Schmidt, Beardsley, & Clements III, A Survey of Industrial Use of Municipal Wastewater, in COMPLETE WATEREusE 632, 641 (L. Cecil ed. 1973).
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